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 Counsel for Appellees Anthony Emmanouil, Eugenia Emmanouil and West Belt 
Auto Supply, Inc. 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 This matter arises from a complex series of business transactions involving 
Anthony and Eugenia Emmanouil (“the Emmanouils”), their son Zachary, and Vincent 
Roggio (“Roggio”).  There is a long and tortured history regarding the various 
transactions which need not be repeated here.  Of these matters, the two that require this 
Court’s attention are a mortgage loan the Emmanouils provided to Roggio and the 
attempted sale of West Belt Auto, the Emmanouils’ business in Houston, Texas, to 
Roggio.  Both deals fell apart, culminating in the present litigation.  The Emmanouils 
sued for non-payment of the mortgage.  Roggio sued for breach of the contract of sale of 
West Belt.   
 Over many years of litigation, the District Court produced numerous opinions.  
Ultimately, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the Emmanouils, and the District Court 
granted the Emmanouils’ motion for attorneys’ fees.  Roggio now appeals the District 
Court’s rulings on summary judgment, various pretrial motions, and the award of 
attorneys’ fees.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s 
decisions, but modify the award of attorneys’ fees.    
 We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential 
I.  Background 
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facts. 
 The relationship between Zachary and Roggio began in 2001.  At that time, 
Zachary was an associate at Concepcion, Rojas and Santos, LLP (“CRS”), a law firm in 
Florida.  Roggio was one of CRS’s clients.  Zachary was assigned to represent Roggio in 
the Haught matter in state court in Florida.  An effort to collect missing funds,1 the 
Haught matter required at least one hearing in Florida on October 10, 2001.  During that 
hearing, Roggio lied under oath.2
 The termination of the firm’s representation of Roggio did not end the relationship 
between Zachary and Roggio.  They developed a personal friendship, leading them to 
enter into a variety of business ventures, some of which are the subject of the present 
case.   
  Roggio alleges he did so with Zachary’s imprimatur as 
a litigation strategy.  For reasons not relevant here, on February 13, 2002, CRS moved to 
withdraw their representation of Roggio.  The Florida state court granted the motion.   
 The two intertwined deals at issue here are an $850,000 mortgage loan that the 
Emmanouils provided to Roggio and the attempted sale of West Belt Auto to Roggio. 
Suffice it to say, the business deals did not go well.  The Emmanouils sued Roggio, 
                                                 
1 The merits and details of this matter are not relevant to the matter before us.   
 
2 Specifically, Roggio falsely asserted (1) that he was an attorney who had been a 
member of the Pennsylvania bar for 15 years and (2) that he had no prior felony 
convictions.  The record of this testimony was not sealed, and the transcripts were 
available as a public record.   
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alleging that he failed to repay the mortgage loan.  Roggio filed a separate action against 
the Emmanouils for breach of contract for the sale of West Belt Auto.  Roggio’s 
complaint included claims against Zachary and CRS for malpractice.  Zachary was 
dismissed from the case when he filed for personal bankruptcy.  The District Court 
ordered that the two actions be consolidated.   
 Roggio immediately sought the disqualification of counsel for the Emmanouils 
and Zachary.  The District Court granted this motion, concluding that the joint 
representation of the Emmanouils and Zachary created a risk of disclosure of confidential 
information; specifically, information Roggio may have revealed to Zachary during 
Zachary’s representation of Roggio.  The District Court recognized that Zachary may be 
able to disclose attorney-client confidences to his own counsel as part of his defense, but 
that the Emmanouils should not benefit from those disclosures.3
 The Emmanouils obtained new counsel, Louis Modugno, from McElroy, Deutsch, 
Mulvaney & Carpenter, LLP (“McElroy”).  Roggio also sought to disqualify McElroy, 
essentially for the same reasons he sought disqualification of the Emmanouils’ original 
counsel.  Roggio alleged violations of RPC 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information), 1.9 
(Duties to Former Clients) and 8.4 (Misconduct). 
   
4
                                                 
3 The confidential information forming the basis of Roggio’s claim of attorney-
client privilege was his false testimony in the Haught matter.   
    
 
4 New Jersey Local Civil Rule 103.1(a) provides that “[t]he Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the American Bar Association as revised by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
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 The Magistrate Judge denied the motion, noting that McElroy never represented 
Roggio in any matter, and is currently not representing anyone who owes a duty to 
Roggio pursuant to any Rule of Professional Conduct. As such, RPC 1.6 and 1.9 were not 
implicated.  As to RPC 8.4, Roggio argued that McElroy violated this rule by obtaining 
confidential information about the Haught hearing from Zachary.  Roggio relied upon the 
District Judge’s grant of a motion to seal the transcript of the November 19, 2007 hearing 
to support his argument that the only way McElroy could have learned of the import of 
the Haught
 McElroy countered that it learned of the 
 testimony was through Zachary.   
Haught matter from several of Roggio’s 
submissions, independent of Zachary.  Those submissions included (1) Roggio’s 
counsel’s Rule 2004 examination of Zachary in connection with Zachary’s bankruptcy 
proceedings, (2) Roggio’s counsel’s cross-examination of Zachary during jurisdictional 
discovery, (3) Roggio’s certification in opposition to CRS’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, (4) internet information supplied by Roggio’s counsel in connection 
with a motion to amend, and (5) a Westlaw search.  In addition, Zachary’s deposition 
testimony and Roggio’s certification were filed in support of Roggio’s brief in opposition 
to CRS’s motion to dismiss, and provided information on the Haught
 Based on Roggio’s submission of part of the transcript from the 
 matter.   
Haught
                                                                                                                                                             
shall govern the conduct of the members of the bar admitted to practice in this Court, 
subject to such modifications as may be required or permitted by Federal statute, 
regulation, court rule or decision of law.”   
 hearing, 
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Mr. Modugno conducted further investigation and learned that Roggio was not a member 
of the Pennsylvania bar and had a criminal record.  Roggio offered no evidence to 
contradict Mr. Modugno’s declaration.   
 The Magistrate Judge concluded that Roggio had not met his burden in 
establishing that disqualification was warranted.  That is, Roggio had not shown that 
McElroy assisted Zachary in violating any RPC.  Roggio appealed to the District Judge, 
who affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s decision.    
 Upon the close of discovery, CRS moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
undisputed facts showed that, at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, no attorney-client 
relationship existed between CRS and Roggio and that Zachary was not an agent of CRS.  
The District Court granted this motion, concluding that Roggio failed to provide any 
evidence that Zachary acted with the apparent authority of CRS.   
 The remaining claims went to trial.  The Emmanouils filed an in limine motion 
seeking to allow Zachary to testify during trial. The District Court granted the motion, 
and allowed Zachary to testify regarding “all relevant communications” with Roggio, 
excluding the Haught matter.  The District Court also ruled that the Emmanouils could 
use the Haught matter to impeach Roggio, if appropriate.  At trial, Roggio testified on 
direct at length about the Haught
 Following trial, the Emmanouils sought attorneys’ fees pursuant to a term of the 
 matter.  The jury returned a verdict in favor of the the 
Emmanouils.    
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mortgage loan.  Roggio opposed the motion, arguing that not all of the work performed 
by McElroy was done in an effort to collect the mortgage.  The District Court concluded 
that, after reviewing the documentation provided by the Emmanouils, the “request is both 
reasonable in light of the duration and contentiousness of this litigation, and sufficiently 
documented.”   (App. 32.)  The District Court observed that throughout the long history 
of the case, “it has remained apparent to the Court that the Emmanouils’ fundamental 
effort to collect $850,000 from Roggio under the Note has inexorably permeated the 
entirety of this litigation.”  (Id.)   
II.  Analysis5 
 Three of Roggio’s claims are interrelated — his argument that the District Court’s 
two in limine rulings were in error and his argument that the District Court erred by not 
disqualifying McElroy.  These arguments focus on the disclosure of Roggio’s testimony 
in the 
Attorney-client privilege 
Haught
 According to section 68 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Restatement, the attorney-client 
privilege may be invoked . . . with respect to: (1) a communication (2) made between 
privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal 
 matter, which Roggio argues is protected by attorney-client privilege. 
                                                 
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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assistance for the client.”  Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68; see 
also In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d 276, 289 (3d Cir. 2011) (listing factors).  Excluded 
from the privilege’s protection is any advice that is not legal in nature, such as business 
advice, or communications made in the presence of a third party.  Wachtel v. Health Net 
Inc.
 However, a client can waive the privilege by disclosing the privileged information.  
, 482 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he privilege will extend only to advice which 
is legal in nature. Where a lawyer provides non-legal business advice, the communication 
is not privileged.  Similarly, the protections of the privilege are restricted to those 
communications which are made in confidence, since a client who speaks openly or in 
the presence of a third party needs no promise of confidentiality to induce disclosure.” 
(internal citations omitted)).   
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-24 (3d Cir. 
1991) (“The privilege ‘protects only those disclosures — necessary to obtain informed 
legal advice — which might not have been made absent the privilege.’  Accordingly, 
voluntary disclosure to a third party of purportedly privileged communications has long 
been considered inconsistent with an assertion of the privilege.” (quoting Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (emphasis added))).  The disclosure can be made by the 
client or the client’s attorney, if it either appears the attorney was acting with the apparent 
authority of the client or if the client later ratifies the attorney’s disclosure.  Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 26, 27, 78, 79.   
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 Disqualification of McElroy 
 We review the District Court’s decision denying Roggio’s request to disqualify 
McElroy for an abuse of discretion.  Lazy Oil Co. v. WITCO Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 588 
(3d Cir. 1999).  “[T]o the extent that the questions underlying the disqualification motion 
are purely legal . . . our review is plenary.”  Id.
 Before this Court, Roggio complains that Zachary’s alleged disclosure of one 
specific communication — Roggio’s testimony in the 
   
Haught matter — warrants the 
disqualification of McElroy.  Roggio asserts that “it is without dispute that the law firm 
acquired actual knowledge of all of Roggio’s confidences.”  (Appellant’s Br. 31.)  
However, Roggio fails to point to any confidences that were disclosed, other than his 
perjury in the Haught
 As already discussed, McElroy learned of Roggio’s perjury in the 
 matter.  
Haught matter 
through disclosures made by Roggio and independent investigations conducted by 
counsel based on those disclosures.  Roggio offers only unsubstantiated assertions to 
rebut this evidence.  Given the clear and unrebutted evidence that McElroy did not learn 
of the Haught
 In limine rulings 
 matter from Zachary, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s 
decision to deny the motion to disqualify McElroy.   
 “‘[W]e review the district court’s decisions to admit or exclude evidence for abuse 
of discretion, although our review is plenary as to the interpretation or application of a 
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legal standard underlying such a decision.’”  In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 
350, 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293 (3d 
Cir.1997)).  Under this deferential standard, we will not disturb the District Court’s 
exercise of discretion unless there is a clear error or “no reasonable person would adopt 
the district court’s view.”  Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citation omitted).  Unless otherwise barred, relevant evidence is admissible, and relevant 
evidence is any evidence that tends to make a consequential fact more or less probable.  
See
 Over Roggio’s objection that “Zachary’s testimony should be precluded as 
privileged attorney/client communication,” the District Court granted the Emmanouils’ in 
limine motion seeking to allow Zachary to testify at trial.  The District Court concluded 
that  
 Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402 & 403. 
 Roggio has squarely placed his relevant communications with 
Zachary at issue in this case.  The merit of that argument is not 
reasonably disputable.  A review of Roggio’s complaint, let alone 
the myriad briefs, certifications and exhibits submitted by Roggio 
during the years of motion practice in this case, cleanly [sic] indicate 
that Roggio’s dealings with Zachary are central, at issue in this case 
in the claims against the Emmanouils and to his defenses against 
[the] Emmanouil’s [sic] various claims against him.   
 
 Simply put, the years-long relationship between Roggio and 
Zachary is either the very basis or at least essential to the issues tried 
before the Court. As such, to disallow Zachary’s testimony, as 
Roggio seeks to do here under the guise of attorney/client privilege, 
is improper.  The motion to permit Zachary to testify at trial 
regarding all relevant communications with Roggio will therefore be 
granted. 
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 I note that there is no motion to seek to have him testify as to 
anything else which might implicate any privilege, but to try to use 
the privilege as a sword rather than the shield, even assuming that 
there was [an] attorney/client relationship, which seems to be 
disputed here, would not be allowed.  
 
  (App. 907-08.) 
 Roggio also sought to bar the Emmanouils’ use of the Haught matter during trial.  
The District Court allowed the use of the Haught
 We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
Zachary to testify since there was no indication that Zachary’s testimony would breach 
the attorney-client privilege.  No evidence indicates that Zachary represented Roggio in 
connection with the mortgage loan the Emmanouils provided to Roggio.  To the contrary, 
the evidence shows that Roggio had another attorney, Catherine Jannarone, representing 
him in connection with the mortgage loan.  None of the communications between Roggio 
and Zachary in connection with the mortgage loan could possibly be protected by 
attorney-client privilege, since no attorney-client relationship existed.   
 matter for impeachment purposes.  
(S.A. 803-09.) 
 As to testimony relating to the sale of West Belt, we similarly find that no 
attorney-client relationship existed.  Many, if not all, of the discussions Zachary testified 
about included other parties.  Statements made in the presence of third parties who are 
not subject to the privilege are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.  Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 71.  Chevron, 650 F.3d at 289-90, Wachtel, 482 
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F.3d at 231. 
 Even if an attorney-client relationship existed between Roggio and Zachary with 
respect to the West Belt transaction, the District Court correctly noted that Roggio placed 
the West Belt transaction at issue when he filed his complaint, thus invoking an exception 
to the attorney-client privilege.  Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co.
 The District Court did not allow Zachary to testify on direct about any aspect of 
his representation of Roggio in the 
, 32 F.3d 
851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The advice of counsel is placed in issue where the client asserts 
a claim or defense, and attempts to prove that claim or defense by disclosing or 
describing an attorney client communication.”)  In addition to raising the West Belt 
transaction as an issue in the complaint, Roggio deposed Zachary numerous times during 
discovery.  During the depositions, Zachary was asked about the West Belt negotiations 
and related documents.   
Haught matter.  The District Court’s order simply 
allowed the Emmanouils to use Roggio’s public testimony in the Haught matter for 
impeachment purposes, should Roggio put his alleged status as an attorney in issue.  Not 
only was this order very limited in its scope, but, as it turned out, Zachary did not testify 
on direct about the Haught matter.6
                                                 
6 At one point during his direct testimony, Zachary expressed concern that the 
question “kind of goes to when I was representing the previous client.”  (App. 142.)  Mr. 
Modugno stopped Zachary, rephrased his question, and stated “I don’t want to get into 
your prior representation of Mr. Roggio or any related entitiy.”  (Id.) 
  Rather, Roggio’s counsel asked Zachary about the 
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Haught matter on cross.   Additionally, Roggio testified at length about the Haught
 We conclude that the District Court ruled correctly that the attorney-client 
privilege is inapplicable.  As such, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
regarding the in limine rulings.   
 matter 
during his direct testimony.  
 We review the District Court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. 
Summary judgment in favor of CRS 
Azur v. 
Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010).  “To that end, we are 
required to apply the same test the district court should have utilized initially.”  Chambers 
ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md.
 Summary judgment is appropriate “where the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
, 989 F.2d 635, 637 
(3d Cir. 1993)). 
Azur, 601 F.3d at 
216 (quoting Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805-06 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing FED. 
R. CIV. P. 56(c))).7
                                                 
7  FED. R. CIV. P. 56 was revised in 2010.  The standard previously set forth in 
subsection (c) is now codified as subsection (a).  The language of this subsection is 
unchanged, except for “one word — genuine ‘issue’ bec[ame] genuine ‘dispute.’”  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note, 2010 amend. 
  To be material, a fact must have the potential to alter the outcome of 
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the case.  See Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).  “Once the 
moving party points to evidence demonstrating no issue of material fact exists, the non-
moving party has the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor.”  Azur, 601 
F.3d at 216.  In determining whether summary judgment is warranted “[t]he evidence of 
the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his 
favor.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Chambers ex rel. 
Chambers, 587 F.3d at 181.  “Further, [w]e may affirm the District Court=s order granting 
summary judgment on any grounds supported by the record.”  Kossler v. Cristani
 On appeal, Roggio argues that summary judgment should not have been granted 
because issues of material fact existed regarding CRS’s liability for Zachary’s 
malpractice, based on Zachary acting  as CRS’s agent. 
, 564 
F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
8
                                                 
8  Significantly, the evidence shows that CRS’s representation of Roggio ended 
when the firm withdrew from representing him in the Haught matter on February 13, 
2002.  Roggio never entered into another retainer agreement with CRS on any other 
matter.  Given the lack of a direct relationship with CRS, the only way for Roggio’s 
claim of malpractice to succeed is based on an agency argument.   
  Assuming, without deciding, that 
Zachary did engage in malpractice, there was no evidence to support the claim that 
Zachary was an agent of CRS, acting with CRS’s direct authority.  Therefore, the only 
other avenue available to Roggio in support of his claim is an argument that Zachary 
acted with the apparent authority of CRS.  
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 In New Jersey, “[t]he party seeking to rely on the agency relationship based upon 
apparent authority must establish: ‘(1) that the principal has manifested his consent to the 
exercise of such authority or has knowingly permitted the agent to assume the exercise of 
such authority; (2) that the third person knew of the facts and, acting in good faith, had 
reason to believe, and did actually believe, that the agent possessed such authority; and 
(3) that the third person, relying on such appearance of authority, has changed his 
position and will be injured or suffer loss if the act done or transaction executed by the 
agent does not bind the principal.’”  Staron v. Weinstein, 701 A.2d 1325, 1327 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (quoting  Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, Inc.
 The District Court concluded that no evidence indicated “anyone in any capacity 
at CRS ‘manifested consent’ or ‘knowingly permitted’ Zachary to represent Roggio” 
after the firm’s withdrawal in the 
, 612 A.2d 
322, 335 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)). 
Haught matter.  (App. 17.)  The District Court also 
noted that Roggio failed to establish the third element — that he relied upon the 
representation and will be harmed by that reliance.  As the District Court stated, “the 
Court cannot analyze evidence that simply does not exist in the record.”  (App. 17.)  We, 
like the District Court, have found nothing that would indicate Roggio relied on Zachary 
being an employee of CRS in making any of his business or legal decisions.  As no 
genuine issue as to a material fact existed, summary judgment was appropriate.   
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  Pursuant to a provision in the mortgage loan, the Emmanouils sought attorneys’ 
fees after the verdict was entered in their favor.  The District Court granted the amount 
sought in full.   
Attorneys’ fees 
 Roggio appeals this decision, arguing that “the total fees granted were for services 
well beyond the scope of the single claim covered by a contract provision providing for 
recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees needed to enforce that one agreement.”  
(Appellant’s Br. 48.)  Additionally, Roggio argues that the fees should be reduced by the 
amount of time spent on claims that were unsuccessful.   
 “We review the District Court’s attorneys’ fees award for abuse of discretion 
‘which can occur if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper 
procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon findings of fact that are 
clearly erroneous.’”  In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 727 (3d Cir. 2001)).  
“Notwithstanding our deferential standard of review, it is incumbent upon a district court 
to make its reasoning and application of the fee-awards jurisprudence clear, so that we, as 
a reviewing court, have a sufficient basis to review for abuse of discretion.”  Gunter v. 
Ridgewood Energy Corp.
 Here, the District Court made its reasoning clear.  However, we find that it abused 
its discretion in concluding that it would be difficult to parse out the mortgage-related 
, 223 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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work from other work.  Based upon our independent review of the record, we find that 
90% of the work done related to the recovery under the mortgage note.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the attorneys’ fee award should be reduced by 10%. 
VI. Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of CRS, the District Court’s rulings on the in limine motions, and the 
District Court’s denial of Roggio’s motion to disqualify McElroy.  We will vacate the 
award of attorneys’ fees, and remand the matter to the District Court for action consistent 
with this opinion.    
